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THE SUB-COMMISSION'S INITIATIVE ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
DAvID WEISSBRODT* AND KELL SCHOFF**
Abstract
In 2000 the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights adopted a resolution raising concerns about the consistency of
international intellectual property protections and human rights norms. This article
summarises human rights norms relevant to intellectual property and the pertinent
aspects of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
which overlap or potentially conflict. The article provides several examples ofpotential
conflict and how they might be resolved. The article demonstrates that the Sub-
Commission resolution helped to initiate a major international discussion and some
action on the relationship between human ights and intellectual property.
1. INTRODUCTION
On 17 August 2000, the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights (the Sub-Commission) adopted Resolution
2000/7, entitled 'Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights'.' This
resolution indicated the Sub-Commission's belief that international
intellectual property regimes were not adequately taking into account
human rights norms.2 Resolution 2000/7 called on UN Member States,
intergovernmental bodies, and various UN entities to reaffirm their
commitments towards the achievement of international human rights
norms, adopt a human rights approach to the development of international
intellectual property regimes, and to further study the interaction between
intellectual property protection and human rights. Resolution 2000/7 has
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UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Intellectual Property
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[hereinafter Resolution 2000/7].
2 Ibidem, at para. 2.
l bidem, at paras 4-15.
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helped to initiate a UN effort to modify global trade and finance in light of
human rights concerns.
This article will first examine how the seemingly disparate interests of
trade and globalisation, intellectual property protection, and human rights
norms converged ultimately in the adoption of Resolution 2000/7. It will
then review what steps have been taken by the UN and other international
norm-setting institutions in response to the Sub-Commission's call for
increased awareness and integration of human rights norms into intellectual
property protection regimes. Finally, it will summarise what the Sub-
Commission hopes will be its next steps in promoting a human rights
approach to international intellectual property protection and trade
liberalisation.
2. ELEMENTS LEADING TO THE ADOPTION OF RESOLUTION
200017
2.1. International Agreements
A brief review of a few key international agreements may help to frame the
rationale behind Resolution 2000/7's call for the integration of human
rights norms into intellectual property protection schemes.
(1) Human Rights Treaties
In Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural RightS4 the States Parties 'recognize the right of everyone (...) to
[both] enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications', on the
one hand, and to 'benefit from the protection of the moral and material
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which
he is the author', on the other. Hence, international human rights law
recognised the rights of inventors and authors as well as simultaneously
focusing on the public right to benefit from their inventions and works of
art. Article 15 does not, however, indicate how a balance might be struck
between the creators, the economic interests that acquire their intellectual
property, and the beneficiaries of creativity.
The Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant does, however, contain
several other provisions bearing upon access to the fruits of inventions. In
Article 11 States Parties 'recognize the rights of everyone to an adequate
standard of living (...), including adequate food, clothing and housing, and
to the continuous improvement of living conditions'. Further, States Parties
recognise in Article 11 'the fundamental right of everyone to be free from
hunger (...) [and accordingly agree to] improve methods of production,
4 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UN
GAOR Supp. (No. 16), at 49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into force 3 January 1976.
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conservation and distribution of food by making full use of technical and
scientific knowledge...' In Article 12 the States Parties to the Economic,
Social and Cultural Covenant also 'recognize the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health'
which shall be achieved by the 'prevention, treatment and control (...) of
diseases' as well as the 'creation of conditions which would assure to all
medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness'.
Just as the Economic, Social and Cultural Covenant does not specify how
to balance between the rights of inventors, owners, and users of intellectual
property in Article 15, there is another balancing process between the rights
of inventors or owners of inventions under Article 15 and the rights of the
hungry, ill-housed, or the sick who are protected under Articles 11 and 12.
Article 2 of the Covenant provides some guidance as to how governments
should achieve these rights. Under Article 2 States Parties only undertake to
'take steps (...) to the maximum of available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in'
Articles 11, 12, and 15 of the Covenant.
The Covenant is subject to authoritative interpretation by the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Committee has provided
more specific guidance on how to implement the general and potentially
conflicting responsibilities of States Parties. The Committee has declared
that States Parties have a 'minimum core obligation to ensure the
satisfaction of each of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each
of the rights'. In particular, the Committee 'emphasize[d] that any
intellectual property regime that makes it more difficult to comply with its
core obligations in relation to health, food, [or] education (...) is
inconsistent with the legally binding obligations of the State party'. 6 The
Committee's statement reminded States Parties of the 'importance of
integrating international human rights norms into the enactment and
interpretation of intellectual property law' in a balanced manner that
protects public and private interests in knowledge without infringing on
fundamental human rights. 7
A second major human rights treaty relevant to understanding the nexus
between human rights and intellectual property - particularly with respect
to copyright - is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.8
5 Commission on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3, The Nature of
States Parties Obligations (Article 2(1) of the Covenant), 5th Session, 1990, Compilation of
General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty
Bodies, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 1, at 45 (1994).
6 Commission on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Human Rights and Intellectual Property:
Statement of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 27th Session, Agenda item 3,
UN Doc. E/C.12/2001/15 (2001), at para. 12.
7 lbidem, at para. 18.
8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp.
(No. 16), at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into force 23 March 1976. The Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights has been ratified by 149 nations.
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Article 19(2) of the Civil and Political Covenant provides that '[e]veryone
shall have the right to freedom of expression (...) includ[ing] freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas (...) either orally, in writing
or in print'. Article 19(3), however, allows governments to place substantial
restrictions on the broad rights in Article 19(2) insofar as those limitations
are 'provided by law and are necessary' for 'the protection of national
security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals'.
Unlike the robust and primary freedom of speech guaranteed by the First
Amendment to the US Constitution, the heavily restricted freedom of
expression granted by Article 19 of the Civil and Political Covenant affords
somewhat less basis for arguing that freedom of expression should trump or
narrow copyright. Nonetheless, it has been suggested that Article 19 could
support an international right to fair use, just as the First Amendment does
in the United States.9
Based on language similar to the Covenant's Article 19, the European
Convention on Human Rightsio informs a human rights approach to
intellectual property protection. Article 10(1) of the European Convention
on Human Rights recognises that '[e]veryone has the right to freedom of
It is unclear, however, whether a prohibition on fair use might arguably fit within the need to
protect 'national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals'.
While the concepts of 'national security and public order' have been expansively interpreted
in the past couple of years, it is uncertain whether they could be used as a basis for
establishing an appropriate balance between copyright and freedom of expression. See also
paragraph 2.1 (2), infra (discussing the ordre public clause in the TRIPS Agreement). There is
also a danger in relying too heavily on US precedent pertaining to fair use and the First
Amendment. Two recent copyright cases signal a narrowing of the scope of protection for
expression available under the fair use doctrine. In Universal City Studios, Inc. vs. Corley, 273
F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001), the Second Circuit hinted at the potential vulnerability of the fair use
defense when it noted that 'the Supreme Court has never held that fair use is constitutionally
required...' Universal City Studios, 273 F.3d at 458. Although the Universal City Studios court
conceded that 'some isolated statements in [the Supreme Court's] opinions might arguably
be enlisted for [a fair use] requirement', the Second Circuit's emphatic assertion that 'the
DMCA [Digital Millennium Copyright Act] does not impose even an arguable limitation on
the opportunity to make a variety of traditional fair uses of DVD movies' indicates that US
judges are not particularly receptive to fair use arguments that attempt to invalidate current
copyright protection laws. Ibidem, at 459. In Eldred vs Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003), the
Supreme Court recently confirmed the difficulty of using fair use as a tool to challenge the
constitutionality of federal copyright legislation. In upholding the constitutionality of the
Copyright Term Extension Act, the Supreme Court declined to impose the 'uncommonly
strict scrutiny on a copyright scheme that incorporates its own speech-protective purposes
and safeguards', reasoning that, because the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment to
the Constitution were 'adopted close in time, (...) copyright's limited monopolies are
compatible with free speech principles'. Eldred, 123 S.Ct. at 788. The Supreme Court went on
to state that '[t]he First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make - or decline to
make - one's own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other
people's speeches'. lbidem, at 789. In light of the narrow scope of fair use seen in Universal City
Studios and Eldred, advocates of a human rights approach to intellectual property rights should
be wary of relying too heavily on US precedent to buttress an argument for a right to fair use
under Article 19 of the Civil and Political Covenant.
1S Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, ETS No. 5 (1950).
184
The Sub-Commission's Initiative on Human Rights and Intellectual Property
expression', which includes 'freedom to hold opinions and to receive and
impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and
regardless of frontiers'. The freedom of expression, however, is circumscri-
bed byArticle 10(2), which states that '[t]he exercise of these freedoms (...)
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions and penalties as
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the
interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
[and] for the protection of the reputation or rights of others...'
The Article 10 freedom of expression argument was recently raised in an
unsuccessful challenge to English copyright law. In Ashdown vs Telegraph
Group, Ltd.," a newspaper publisher that had printed verbatim excerpts from
an MP's personal diaries attempted to avoid liability for copyright
infringement by arguing that the Article 10 freedom of expression trumped
the copyright protection provided by the English Copyright, Patents and
Designs Act (CPDA). The English Court of Appeal rejected that contention,
reasoning that, because 'l[t]he needs of a democratic society include the
recognition and protection of private property (...) [which] includes
copyright', there was 'no reason why the provisions of the [CPDA] should
not be sufficient to give effect to the Convention [Article 10] right subject
only to such restrictions as are permitted by Article 10(2)'.1 Although
Article 10 protection for freedom of expression did not control in this
particular case, the Court of Appeal nonetheless acknowledged that
'rare circumstances can arise where the right of freedom of expression
will come into conflict with the protection afforded by the [CPDA],
notwithstanding the express exceptions to be found in the [CPDA]. In
these circumstances, we consider that the Court is bound (...) to apply
the [CPDA] in a manner that accommodates the right of freedom of
expression.
This dictum indicates that courts may in some contexts take human rights
norms into account when ruling on intellectual property litigation.14
(2) International Intellectual Property Protection: The TRIPS Agreement
In adopting Resolution 2000/7, the Sub-Commission expressed a funda-
mental concern that the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
I The Right Honourable Paddy Ashdown MPPCvs Telegraph Group Ltd., [2002] E.C.C. 19 (Eng. C.A.).
12 Ibidem, at para. 367.
13 Ibidem, at para. 369.
14 For more extensive discussion of the Ashdown Case and its implications, see generally, Joseph,
Louis, 'Human Rights Versus Copyright: The Paddy Ashdown Case', Entertainment Law Review,
Vol. 13, No. 3, 2002, p. 72; Merris, Amos, 'Can We Speak Freely Now? Freedom of Expression
under the Human Rights Act', European Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 6, 2002, p. 750.
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Intellectual Property (TRIPS) does not adequately recognise human rights
norms. Resolution 2000/7 reads in part:
Noting (...) that actual or potential conflicts exist between the
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the realization of
economic, social and cultural rights in relation to, inter alia, impedi-
ments to the transfer of technology to developing countries, the
consequences for the enjoyment of the right to food, or plant variety
rights and the patenting of genetically modified organisms, 'bio-piracy'
and the reduction of communities' (especially indigenous communi-
ties) control over their own genetic and natural resources and cultural
values, and restrictions on access to patented pharmaceuticals and the
implications for the enjoyment of the right to health...
Declares (...) that since the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement does
not adequately reflect the fundamental nature and indivisibility of all
human rights (...) there are apparent conflicts between the intellectual
property rights regime embodied in the TRIPS Agreement, on the one
hand, and international human rights law, on the other; (...)15
Since TRIPS is such a central focus of the Sub-Commission's concern, it is
appropriate to present a brief overview of the TRIPS Agreement.
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
was a product of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) held in 1994. Broadly speaking, TRIPS extended
intellectual property rights by creating a new World Trade Organization
(WTO) enforcement mechanism with the availability of reciprocal trade
sanctions.' 7 TRIPS requires that WTO States protect intellectual property by
enacting national legislation and regulatory procedures.' 8
15 Resolution 2000/7, op.cit. (note 1), at preface and para. 2.
16 Merges, Robert P., Menell, Peter S. and Lemley, Mark A., Intellectual Property in the New
Technological Age, Aspen Publishers, Inc., New York, 2nd ed. 2000, pp. 319-320.
17 The preface of TRIPS outlines a desire to 'reduce distortions and impediments to
international trade (...) [by] taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate
protection of intellectual property rights, and ensur[ing] that measures and procedures to
enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade'. It
also recognises the need for 'new rules and disciplines concerning (...) the provision of
effective and appropriate means for the enforcement of trade-related intellectual property
rights...' Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement], 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex IC, 'Legal Instruments-Results of the
Uruguay Round', Vol. 31, 33 International Law Magazine, 81, 1994, available at www.wto.org/
english/docs e/legale/27-trips.pdf.
18 'Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. (...) Members shall be free to
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within
their own legal system and practice.' Ibiden, at Article 1(1).
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TRIPS recognises that nations at different levels of development will have
differing policy goals with respect to the scope of intellectual property
protection.1 9 Article 7 notes that 'protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of
technological innovation', yet should do so 'in a manner conducive to
social and economic welfare'. 0 Article 8 explicitly mentions that WTO
States may take into account the 'protect[ion] of public health and
nutrition, and promot[ion of] the public interest in sectors of vital
importance to their socio-economic and technological development' when
tailoring their intellectual property regimes to the norms mandated by
TRIPS. These provisions reveal a fundamental tension in TRIPS between
the economic interests of intellectual property rights holders, on the one
hand, and State and public interests in promoting public health and
economic development, on the other.
This tension is reiterated in the specific context of patent protection in
TRIPS Articles 27, 28, 30, and 31. Article 28 provides the general rule
extending exclusive protection to patent holders.2 3 Article 27, however,
permits governments to 'exclude from patentability' any inventions as to
'protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant
24life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment'.
Furthermore, Article 30 describes broad parameters within which it is
acceptable for member States to intrude on the exclusivity of patent rights:
'Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent
owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.'2 5
19 TRIPS prefaces its substantive articles with a recognition of 'the special needs of the least-
developed country Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic implementa-
tion of laws and regulations in order to enable them to create a sound and viable economic
base.' Ibidem, at preface.
20 Ibidem, at Article 7.
21 'Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures
necessary to protect health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital
importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that such
measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.' Ibidem, Article 8.
22 The patent protection system in most developed countries typically encourages innovation by
providing an economic incentive, in the form of a limited term monopoly on the production
and sale of the patentable subject matter. In the United States, this policy is rooted in the text
of the Constitution, which authorises Congress 'To promote the Progress of (...) useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to (...) Inventors the exclusive right to their (...) Discoveries'.
US Constitution, Article I, para. 8, cl. 8.
23 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, at Article 28(1)(a).
24 Ibidem, at Article 27(2).
25 Ibidem, at Article 30.
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Article 31 specifies the threshold conditions and limitations that must be
satisfied if a State wishes to derogate from the exclusivity of the patent
protection afforded by Article 28. Before allowing the use of the subject
matter of a patent without the authorisation of the patent holder, a
government must first attempt to 'obtain authorization from the right
holder on reasonable commercial terms'.2 6 That requirement, however,
can be waived 'in the case of national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use'. 27 Even if such
exigent circumstances exist, the government must limit 'the scope and
duration of such use (...) to the purpose for which it was authorized',"
and such use is to be 'terminated if and when the circumstances which led
to [the unauthorized use] cease to exist and are unlikely to recur.'2
Hence, Articles 30 and 31 frame the balance of interests between
intellectual property rights of patent holders, States, and the public at
large.
TRIPS' copyright protection primarily guards the copyright interests of
literary and artistic creators from developed nations. Gaps exist in the
copyright protection provided for artistic and literary manifestations of
traditional knowledge and indigenous culture. TRIPS incorporates Articles
1-21 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works30 as the basis for TRIPS copyright protection. The language of the
Berne Convention does provide some protection for works that encompass
traditional knowledge and indigenous culture.3 2 Significantly though,
TRIPS does not include the rights and obligations under Berne Convention
Article 6bis, which confers moral rights upon copyright holders. The
refusal to recognise moral rights of authors partially explains why some
indigenous artists have difficulty in protecting their creations from
26 Ibidem, at Article 31(b).
27 Idem.
28 Ibidem, at Article 31(c).
2 Ibidem, at Article 31(g).
3o Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works [hereinafter Berne Convention],
Paris Act of 24 July 1971, as amended on 28 September 1979, available at www.wipo.int/
treaties/ip/index.html.
3 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, at Article 9(1).
32 The Berne Convention provides copyright protection for 'literary and artistic works', which
include 'every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be form
of its expression, such as (...) works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving
and lithography...' Berne Convention, supra note 30, at Article 2(1).
3 Berne Convention Article 6" reads in part: 'Independently of the author's economic rights,
and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of,
or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his
honor or reputation.' Ibidem, at Article 6bis(1).
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undesirable modifications or uses. 34 Furthermore, the remaining TRIPS
copyright provisions focus on rights involving computer pro rammes,
cinematographic works, sound recordings, and broadcasting: These
TRIPS provisions are more valuable to copyright holders in developed
nations than to literary and artistic creators seeking to protect traditional
knowledge and indigenous cultural rights.
Intellectual property protections under TRIPS benefit from the
enforcement mechanism of the WTO. Under this system, when disputes
are raised under WTO law by a government seeking examination of the
legality of a national measure, the result is a binding decision addressing the
validity of the national regulation.36 If the complaining nation prevails, it
may then place retaliatory tariffs on goods from the defending country. 7
(3) Dealing with Differences and Overlaps Between Human Rights Law and TRIPS
As compared with the robust sanctions-based enforcement mechanism of
TRIPS within the WTO, human rights treaties have modest implementation
procedures. Both the Human Rights Covenants require that States Parties
report periodically on their progress in achieving the rights in the respective
treaties. Those reports are reviewed by 18-member treaty bodies elected by
the States Parties. The treaty bodies conclude their reviews of state reports by
issuing concluding comments in which issues are raised and recommenda-
tions are made. When the government needs to make a further report -
usually after a couple of years - those concerns should be the subject of
attention. The Human Rights Committee also has the capacity to adjudicate
complaints from the individual residents of the 104 nations that have
ratified the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Committee decisions are, however, not considered to be
3 Upon reading a working draft of this article, one scholar noted that 'while it's true that
indigenous authors sometimes have difficulty protecting their works under established
intellectual property doctrines, this relates to broader issues than moral rights. In particular,
differing conceptions of ownership and differing understandings of the desirability of
claiming exclusive rights often underlie the inadequacy of protection. Thus, even if TRIPS
were amended to protect moral rights, many indigenous authors would still face these same
difficulties'. Comments of Professor Laurence R. Helfer, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles,
January 2003. For a further discussion of problems involving intellectual property protection
of indigenous rights, see generally, paragraph 2.2, infra.
3 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, at Articles 10-14.
36 See WTO, Guide to the Uruguay Round Agreements, WTO Secretariat, Washington, 1999, pp. 18-
27 (discussing dispute settlement through the WTO).
37 See ibidem, at pp. 23-24 ('For a government found at fault in a dispute, the possibility of
[tariffs as the] ultimate sanction of retaliation is undoubtedly a strong inducement to settle
the matter by withdrawing the offending measure or by giving compensation.'). See also
Shell, G. Richard, 'Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory', Duke Law journa4
Vol. 44, 1995, p. 829, at p. 832 (discussing the WTO dispute resolution system). While it can
be argued that sovereign States can still ignore a WTO ruling, the cost associated with
retaliatory tariffs, and the threat that such a decision poses to the viability of the entire WTO
system and the world export economy militate against such a response. See WTO, op.cit. (note
36), at p. 24 (discussing retaliation measures).
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binding. Indeed, human rights norms are principally implemented at the
international level by persuasion and embarrassment rather than sanctions.
Hence, there is an imbalance in the way international obligations are
effectuated under TRIPS and human rights treaties.
A related problem posed by the creation of the WTO with its
incorporation of TRIPS is its failure to address any conflicts that arise
under international law when a country has ratified treaties, such as the
International Covenants on Human Rights, that may differ with its
obligations under the WTO. A nation cannot generally absolve itself of its
obligations under one treaty by ratifying a second treaty later." In a
situation in which there is a potential conflict, the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties calls for the interpretation of the two treaties so as to give
effect to both.39 It might be argued that WATO law, including TRIPS,
qualifies as lex specialis, but that argument would not exempt nations from
their human rights obligations and would not prevent human rights treaty
bodies from assessing the human rights implications of intellectual property
measures.40 Hence, despite the stronger implementation procedures of the
WTO, governments are obligated to seek interpretations of both TRIPS and
the human rights treaties which would avoid violating either treaty regime.
The WTO has given short shrift to human rights norms when deciding
conflicts in the dispute resolution system. The WTO Dispute Settlement
Panels and Appellate Body are primarily focused on scrutinising the legality
of national measures under GATT/WTO law. 41 They are not required to
3 In the unlikely situation in which all the parties to both treaties are the same, however, and
the two treaties relate to the same subject matter, the first treaty may be considered amended
by the second treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 'when all the
parties to [an] earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not
terminated or suspended in operation (...) the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its
provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty'. Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, 27 January 1980, at Article 30(3). Hence, the later treaty is
controlling where there is a conflict, and so is treated as an amendment to the earlier treaty.
39 'When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible
with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail', ibidem, at Article
30(2). To the extent that the treaties are compatible, then, each is given effect. At least one
WTO Panel Report acknowledges that States Parties must seek interpretations that avoid
violating both treaties. See Report of the Panel, Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the
Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DR59/R, WT/DS64/R, 23 July 1998
(stating that 'in public international law there is a presumption against conflict').
o Although the WTO is a specialised agency established under Article 57 of the UN Charter,
that provision does not give the WTO superior legal powers. The UN Charter protects human
rights in Articles 1, 55, and 56. Further, under Article 103, the UN Charter should be
considered controlling. The authority for establishment of specialised agencies under Article
57 of the Charter does not diminish the impact of Articles 1, 55, 56 and 103.
4 The Dispute Settlement Panels handle disputes under 'covered agreements', which include
only GATI/WTO law: the agreement establishing the WTO, multilateral trade agreements,
and plurilateral trade agreements. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
Settlement of Disputes, App. 1. The WTO's Dispute Settlement Body cannot 'add to or
diminish the rights and obligation provided' in the covered WTO agreements and human
rights instruments are not among the WTO agreements.
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balance various sectors of national or international law with trade law.42
Further, the WTO dispute resolution system has been criticised for its lack of
transparency and openness to input from amici curiae and other procedures
for knowledgeable input from outside the trade field.
The imbalance in the way international obligations are realised under
TRIPS and the human rights treaties was a significant motivating factor in
the Sub-Commission's decision to adopt Resolution 2000/7.
2.2. Gaps in Protecting Traditional Knowledge, Indigenous Culture, and
Human Rights
Alleged violations of indigenous cultural property rights attained visibility
during the 1990s, before the immediate impetus for the adoption of
Resolution 2000/7 arose. Three examples of indigenous cultures clashing
with intellectual property regimes indicate why the Sub-Commission felt
compelled to advocate human rights protection of traditional knowledge as
part of its resolution.
4 Ibidem, Article I (stating that the agreement covers the documents listed in Appendix I, but
not mentioning any balancing of national concerns). One could argue that some aspects of
human rights law, such as the prohibition of genocide and slavery, constitute jus cogens and
would thus prevail over contrary provision of WTO law. But there is very little agreement as to
which principles qualify as jus cogens, so that argument would probably not broaden the
jurisdiction of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body or the qualifications of its members. One
scholar has noted, however, that 'there is some indication from the Shrimp/Turtle case, Report
of the Appellate Body, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R (12 October 1998) that WTO jurists are willing to consider not only non-
trade treaties but also non-trade soft law when interpreting WTO agreements'. In Shrimp/
Turtle, the Appellate Body concluded that the phrase 'exhaustible natural resources' was an
'evolutionary' concept to 'be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of contemporary
concerns of the community of nations about the protection and conservation of the
environment'. Those concerns, in turn, were reflected not only in treaties regulating natural
resources but also in nonbinding 'declarations' addressing that topic. A similar approach
might be applied to 'evolutionary' terms in TRIPS (especially the open-ended phrases in
Articles 7 and 8), giving them a meaning that 'takes into account human rights norms
endorsed by the international community'. Comments of Professor Helfer, supra note 34.
Helfer also noted that imbalances between TRIPS and human rights treaties seen in the
context of enforcement and implementation procedures extend to substantive norms as well:
'Particularly in the case of economic, social and cultural rights (...) [the human rights]
treaties articulate norms at relatively high levels of generality as compared to the precise and
detailed rules that TRIPS imposes.' Compare, e.g., ICESCR, Article 12 'right to (...) the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health' to Article 30 of TRIPS dealing with
patents. It is hard to see a conflict between these treaty provisions because Article 12 is quite
general in scope, idem. Helfer goes on to note, however, that conflicts do emerge upon
consideration of the Economic and Social Committee's General Comments. For discussion of
the Economic and Social Committee's General Comments, see paragraph 4.4, infra.
4 See Marceau, Gabrielle, 'WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights', European Journal of
International Law, Vol. 17 (noting the effort of the Appellate Body to call for amici curiaebriefs
in the E.C.- Asbestos Case, the criticism of that request by WTO Members, and the response of
the Appellate Body in the US - Certain E.C. Products decision).
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The first two examples illustrate the insufficiency of copyright schemes to
protect Aboriginal Australian cultural interests adequately. In the first case,
an Aboriginal artist named Terry Yumbulul created an artifact called a
Dreaming Star Pole, which represents where one's soul goes after death."
The artifact is sacred to the Aborigines, and Mr. Yumbulul had to undergo
initiation rights in order to be allowed to create the artifact.4 5 Mr. Yumbulul
assigned the copyright on the artifact to an agent,46 who then passed
reproductions of the artifact to the Reserve Bank of Australia, which used
the image on an Australian bank note. Mr. Yumbulul brought suit47 against
the Reserve Bank in an attempt to prevent distribution of the notes, which
the clan considered a blasphemous use of their sacred image.
The High Court of Australia court ruled in favour of the Bank, on
grounds that the copyright had been validly assigned. The court, however,
noted that Australia's copyright law might not 'provide adequate recogni-
tion of Aboriginal community claims to regulate the reproduction and use
of works which are essentially communal in origin', but declined to provide
relief, because 'the question of statutory recognition of Aboriginal
communal interests in the reproduction of sacred objects is a matter for
consideration by law reformers and legislators'.
The second Australian copyright case concerned the use of an Aboriginal
painting as a template for a design woven into Vietnamese-manufactured
carpets. The painting, displayed in the National Gallery of Australia, depicts
a story of the Dreamtime.4 9 The use of a sacred image as a decoration on
which to walk was considered to be highly offensive b the artists and their
clan. The artists, on behalf of the clan, brought suit to enjoin the use of
Symposium, 'Global Intellectual Property Rights: Boundaries of Access and Enforcement,
Panel II: The Law and Policy of Protecting Folklore, Traditional Knowledge, and Genetic
Resources', Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Lawjourna Vol. 12, 2002, p.
753, at p. 760.
4 Ibidem, at p. 761.
46 Probably for use in promoting societal knowledge of Aboriginal culture in educational
settings. See Blakeney, Michael, 'Millpurrurru and Ors v. Indofurn Pty. and Ors-Protecting
Expressions of Aboriginal Folklore Under Copyright Law', E Law - Murdoch University
Electronic Journal of Law, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1995, available at www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/
v2nl/l.html.
4 Yumbulul vs Reserve Bank of Australia, (1991) 21 IPR, p. 481 (Australia).
48 Blakeney, loc.cit. (note 46), citing Yumbulul vs Reserve Bank of Australia, supra note 47, at pp.
490-492.
49 The Dreamtime is the Aboriginal collection of folklore concerning the creation of the world;
virtually all Aboriginal artwork depicting stories of the Dreamtime are semi-sacred.
Symposium, 'Global Intellectual Property Rights', supra note 44 (citing Blakeney, loc.cit.
(note 46)).
5o Aboriginal custom holds that the Dreamtime stories are passed down through tribal
custodians; the right to create depictions of the Dreamtime are similarly passed down from
artist to artist. These custodians act as the keepers of the clan's knowledge on behalf of their
people. See Blakeney, loc.cit. (note 46).
1 Milpurrurru & Ors vs Indofurn Pty. & Ors, (1994) 54 FCR 240 (Australia).
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the image, alleging cultural harm suffered by the clan as a whole. The High
Court of Australia tried to compensate the Aborigines for the cultural harm
they suffered, awarding damages to each of the living artists5 2 for 'flagrant'5 3
copyright infringement. Nonetheless, the Court refused to award damages
to the clan as a whole, on the grounds that Australian copyright law did not
provide a remedy for the alleged infringement of a collective ownership
right.54
The Yumbulul and Milpurrurru cases highlight gaps in the protection of
indigenous rights under existing copyright law regimes. Both cases turn in
part on the problem of establishing authorship. Many indigenous peoples
claim a collective right of ownership, or alternatively assert that styles of art
have been passed down from generation to generation. Such assertions raise
issues of standing to bring suit, and duration of protection to be
conferred. 5 Furthermore, even in cases like Milpurrurru where courts do
provide a remedy, it usually takes the form of monetary compensation. In
many cases, pecuniary gain could never fully compensate for the cultural
harm suffered in these situations, and does little to deter future offenses.
The cultural harms suffered in the Milpurrurru and Yumbulul cases
implicate rights guaranteed under the International Covenant on Econo-
mic, Social and Political Rights. Article 15(1) (a) of the Covenant recognises
the right of everyone 'to take part in cultural life', and Article 15(1) (c)
recognises the right of everyone 'to benefit from the protection of the moral
52 Each artist was awarded Austalian Dollar 16,500 to 'reflect harm (...) suffered in their cultural
environment'. See Blakeney, loc.cit. (note 46).
53 Australian law allows for increased compensatory damages for copyright infringement in cases
where the infringement was executed with 'total disregard not only for the legal rights of the
plaintiff regarding copyright but for his feelings and his sense of family dignity and pride'.
See Willimns vs Settle, (1960) 1 WLR, p. 1072, at p. 1082. In the Milpurrurru Case, it was
established that the Aboriginal depictions had been designated for educational display only,
and that the artists had indicated that use of the images on carpets would be considered
highly offensive to themselves and their clan. See Blakeney, loc.cit. (note 46).
5 The Milpurrurru court stated that 'the statutory remedies do not recognize the infringement
of ownership rights of the kind which reside under Aboriginal law in the traditional owners of
the dreaming stories and the imagery such as that used in the artworks of the present
applicants...', idem. See also Blakeney, loc.cit. (note 46), noting that Australian copyright law
provides remedies for infringement in proportion to the economic damage caused by the
infringement, and further noting that it was untenable to think that the court could quantify
the extent of economic damage to the Aboriginal cultural right.
5 Many copyright regimes require a specific, identifiable author, or at least some identifiable
entity that created the subject matter, in order to confer copyright protection. Since an entire
indigenous clan or regional population generally does not participate in the creation of a
particular artifact, there is a question of who exactly has suffered a legal harm for which they
can pursue a legal remedy. Furthermore, in cases where indigenous peoples claim that the
original depictions were created by ancestors thousands of years ago, most copyright systems
provide scant protection, since the original author's life and limited term of protection has
long since expired.
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and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which he is the author'.
The third traditional knowledge case, which received much greater
publicity, related to the validity of a patent on an extract from the oil of an
Asian tree. The neem tree is indigenous to the Indian subcontinent. Neem
bark has been used for centuries as a traditional medicine, insecticide and
fungicide.5 7 The pharmaceutical manufacturer W.R. Grace Co. initially
obtained a patent58 from the European Patent Office (EPO) on the
fungicidal properties of a neem oil extract, and then (cheekily) tried to sell
the patented product on the Indian market. Upon appeal by the Green
Party of the European Parliament and an Indian nongovernmental
organisation (NGO), the EPO revoked the patent on grounds that it did
not qualify as a novel invention, in light of the traditional use of neem bark
in Indian society."o The EPO's revocation of a patent on neem tree oil
extract was a rare victory for traditional scientific knowledge over modern
patent schemes.
Responding to concerns arising from cases like the neem tree,
Milpurrurru, and Yulumbul, Sub-Commission member Dr. Erica-Irene A.
Daes advocated the protection of indigenous cultural and property rights
since the mid-1990s. As Chairperson and Rapporteur of the Sub-Commis-
sion's Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Dr. Daes was the principal
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 4, at Article 15. For a
more extensive discussion of rights guaranteed under the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, see paragraph 2.1 (1), supra.
57 Hoggan, Karen, 'Neem Tree Patent Revoked', BBC News Online, 11 May 2000, available at
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/745028.stm.
Patent No. EP00436257 (issued 10 July 1991).
59 Symposium, loc.cit. (note 44), at p. 765.
60) Idem.
61 Besides increasing public awareness of the grave risks that corporations would unjustly exploit
indigenous and traditional knowledge, the Neem Tree Case raised three additional points of
interest. First, the US Department of Agriculture was a co-applicant with W.R. Grace for the
neem oil patent, see supra note 58. Hence, the US Government contributed to and
encouraged exploitation of traditional knowledge under current intellectual property
regimes. Second, the plaintiffs in the revocation action argued that, in addition to non-
novelty, Grace's patent should be revoked as 'against public morality' (European Patent
Convention,January 2000). Article 53 reads in part: '[P]atents shall not be granted in respect
of invention the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to the public order or
morality'. Although the EPO declined to rule on that question, the fact that the argument was
brought at all signals a move towards using human rights arguments as a means of combating
unfair intellectual property determinations. Similar arguments could be advanced in future
patent disputes in the context of TRIPS, which contains a 'public morality' article similar to
the one in the European Patent Convention (TRIPS Article 27(2), see supra note 17, says that
'Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention of which within their
territory (...) is necessary to protect ordre public or morality...'). Third, the EPO revoked the
neem oil patent in part because the European Parliament's Green Party advocated the patent
appeal. In the absence of influential and knowledgeable allies like the Greens, indigenous
peoples may lack the resources to raise successful objections to the appropriation of their
traditional knowledge by wealthy corporations.
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author of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.6 2 This
draft Declaration called for the broad recognition and respect for
indigenous peoples' rights, including cultural and intellectual propert
rights.64 Dr. Daes continued to campaign for indigenous peoples' interests,
emphasising that UN Member nations must not only recognise the existence
of indigenous peoples' rights, but also enact national legislation providing
stringent substantive and jurisdictional protection of those rights.
Dr. Daes' Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of
Indigenous Peoples indicates how indigenous rights can be more effectively
protected. Collective ownership and custodial ownership created through
initiation procedures should be recognised and incorporated into national
legal systems. Patent and copyright protection for indigenous knowledge
should be available only after the traditional owners' free and informed
consent has been secured.6 8 States should create prompt and effective
judicial measures to allow traditional owners to 'prevent, punish and obtain
full restitution and just compensation' for unlawful acquisition or use of
their cultural heritage. In addition, 'business and industry should ensure
they have free and informed consent of indigenous peoples when entering
into agreements for the rights (...) to use undescribed species or cultivated
varieties of plants, animals or micro-organisms, or naturally occurring
pharmaceuticals', and 'any agreement should ensure that the indigenous
Daes, Erica-Irene A., 'Equality of Indigenous Peoples Under the Auspices of the United
Nations-Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples', St. Thomas Law Review, Vol. 7,
1995, p. 493, at p. 494.
( UN Commission on Human Rights, United Nations Declaration on the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples,
11th Session, Annex I, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2 (1993). The UN Commission on Human
Rights has referred the draft Declaration to its Working Group on the Draft United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, where it has been under consideration for
eight years.
6 Article 29 reads: 'Indigenous peoples are entitled to the recognition of the full ownership,
control and protection of their cultural and intellectual property. They have the right to
special measures to control, develop and protect their sciences, technologies and cultural
manifestations, including human and other genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge
of the properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures, designs and visual and
performing arts', idem.
6 After preparing the Draft Declaration, see supra note 63, Dr. Daes wrote Principles and Guidelines
for the Protection ofthe Heritage ofIndigenous Peoples in 1995 (UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/26/
annex (1995)) and chaired a revision of those Principles and Guidelines in 2000 (see Report of
the Seminar on the Draft Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous
Peoples, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/26 (2000)).
66 Daes, Erica-Irene, 'Intellectual Property and Indigenous Peoples', American Society of
International Law Proceedings, Vol. 95, 2001, p. 143, at p. 150 (calling for 'strengthening [of]
transboundary jurisdictions of national courts to enforce private international law, and
ensuring international respect for the customary intellectual property laws of indigenous
people as a matter of choice of law').
67 Report of the Seminar on the Draft Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of
Indigenous Peoples, supra note 65, at paras 14, 15, and 24.
I ibidem, at para. 23(c).
69 Ibidem, at para. 23(b).
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peoples continue to be primary beneficiaries of commercial application'.70
Further, 'indigenous peoples and their representative organizations should
(...) participate in all intergovernmental discussions and negotiations in the
field of intellectual property rights, to share their views on the measures
needed to protect their heritage through international law.'71 These
guidelines address many of the inadequacies of intellectual property
protection for traditional heritage highlighted in the Yulumbul, Milpurrurru,
and Neem Tree cases.
Because current legal regimes often provide inadequate protection for
indigenous peoples' knowledge, culture, and human rights, the Sub-
Commission explicitly referred to those concerns as a motivating factor for
the adoption of Resolution 2000/7.
2.3. The (Negative) Impact of Globalisation on the Realisation of Human
Rights
The Sub-Commission indicated that the negative effect of globalisation on
human rights was another motivating factor for the adoption of Resolution
2000/7.7 Specifically, the Sub-Commission relied on reports from two
Special Rapporteurs, as well as from its working group on transnational
corporations, to support a request for 'governments and national, regional
and international economic policy forums to take international human
rights obligations and princi les fully into account in international
economic policy formulation'. Because the Sub-Commission explicitly
referenced these globalisation reports as supporting their decision to adopt
Resolution 2000/7, it is appropriate to examine those reports briefly.
(1) The Special Rapporteurs' Preliminary Report
J. Oloka-Onyango and Deepika Udagama, Sub-Commission Special Rappor-
teurs on globalisation and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights,
submitted a preliminary report to the Sub-Commission two months before
the adoption of Resolution 2000/7. The Special Rapporteurs' report began
by reminding the Sub-Commission that globalisation is not a purely economic
70 Ibidem, at para. 36. By explicitly referencing indigenous rights to plants, animals, and micro-
organisms, the Principles and Guidelines echo a major theme of the Convention on Biological
Diversity (5 June 1992). A product of the 1992 Earth Summit, the Convention on Biological
Diversity seeks to encourage sustainable use of the components of biodiversity, and to share
the benefits of such use in a fair and equitable way. The Neem Tree Case and the debate over
the use of terminator technology in agriculture (see paragraph 2.3 (2), infra) are examples of
biodiversity exploitation that the Convention on Biological Diversity addresses. Sub-
Commission Resolution 2000/7 indicated that the Convention on Biological Diversity was a
motivating factor in the Sub-Commission's decision to adopt Resolution 2000/7. Further
information about the Convention on Biological Diversity, as well as the text of the
Convention, are available at www.fao.org/biodiversity/ (last visited 14 February 2003).
71 Ibidem, at para. 51.
7 Resolution 2000/7, supra note 1, at preface.
7s Ibidem, at para. 4.
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phenomenon that is divorced from human values and policy decisions.
Instead, the report contended that 'the boundaries within which the market
operates are defined politically, in direct negotiations between governments in
multilateral forums, such as the World Trade Organization'. 4 By asserting
that political decisions shape the path of globalisation, the Special
Rapporteurs indicated that some human rights problems can be ameliorated
at their source, by modifying the political decisions that enable globalisation.
The report critiqued the World Trade Organization (WTO) for its
contributions to increasing global inequality and discrimination. The report
characterised the WTO structure and its assumptions about global trade as
being heavily biased in favour of transnational corporations and developed
nations.7 5 While the WTO can be fairly characterised as democratic in form
(since it allows one vote per member and purports to use consensus
decision-making) ,76 in practice it is unfair to less-developed nations, which
are often denied participation in policy-making decisions.7 7 Therefore, the
report called for the WTO's deliberative and policy-setting procedures to be
made more transparent, and more receptive to developing nations.
The Special Rapporteurs' report also disapproved of the WTO's
intellectual property protection system, characterising TRIPS' guarantee
of the patentability of plant varieties and life forms as a 'legal act of
economic hijack'. 7 Furthermore, the Special Rapporteurs recommended
that if the WTO really wanted to commit to a balanced trade liberalisation
scheme, it 'must not only include intellectual property protections of
interest to the developed countries, but also address issues of current or
potential concern for developing countries, such as property rights for
knowledge embedded in traditional medicines, or the pricing of pharma-
ceuticals in developing country markets'.
7" Oloka-Onyango, J. and Udagama, Deepika, The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: Globalization and its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, UN Sub-Commission
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights [hereinafter the Special Rapporteurs'
report], 52nd Session, Item 4, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13 (2000) (citing Cardoso,
Fernando Enrique, Globalization and International Relations: Public Address to the South Affican
Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 26 November 1996, at pp. 5-6).
7 'Indeed, the assumptions on which the rules of WTO are based are grossly unfair and even
prejudiced. Those rules also reflect an agenda that serves only to promote dominant corporatist
interests that already monopolize the arena of international trade', ibidem, at para. 14.
76 Ibidem, at para. 16.
n 'Whether one considers the dispute settlement procedures, the mechanisms for implemen-
ting agreements or the areas selected for negotiations, one comes to realize that the WTO
structure is heavily tilted in favour of developed countries, such that developing countries are,
de facto, kept away from decision-making mechanisms and from policy-making; similarly,
their own specific problems are not sufficiently taken into account', ibidem, at para. 16 (citing
Habbard, Anne-Christine and Guirand, Marie, The WTO and Human Rights, International
Federation of Human Rights, Position Paper, November 1999).
78 Ibidem, at para. 18.
7 Ibidem, at para. 19 (citing Stiglitz, Joseph F., 'Trade and the Developing World: A New
Agenda', Current History, November 1999, p. 387).
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(2) The Working Group on the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational
Corporations
One further precursor of Sub-Commission Resolution 2000/7 arose in the
context of the Sub-Commission's study and drafting in regard to the human
rights obligations of transnational corporations and other business
enterprises. In its Resolution 1998/8 of 20 August 1998 the Sub-Commission
decided 'to establish for a three-year period a sessional working group of the
Sub-Commission, composed of five of its members, taking into account the
principle of equitable geographic distribution, to examine the working
methods and activities of transnational corporations'. 8o The first meeting of
the Working Group in1999 requested preparation of a draft code of conduct
for transnational corporations.8 1 While the first draft code of conduct did
not contain a provision on intellectual property and human rights, more
recent documents" produced by members of the Working Group track
Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement.8 3
The development of genetically modified 'terminator' seeds in the late
1990s was a highly visible example of questionable corporate behaviour that
motivated the adoption of Sub-Commission Resolution 2000/7. Terminator
technology enables seed suppliers to create strains of crop seeds that are
incapable of reproducing. Agribusiness companies 'stood to make huge
profits from the technique, since it meant that farmers could not continue
holding over seeds produced in one growing season for use in the next - a
widespread practice in developing countries'. 84 Although many agricultural
companies were developing genetically modified seeds, the Monsanto
Corporation became the target of widespread public concern over the
anticipated sales of sterile seeds in the markets of developing nations.85 The
international furor eventually led Monsanto to pledge that it would not
commercialise the terminator technology that created sterile seeds.
80 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, The relationship
between the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights and the right to development, and the
working methods and activities of transnational corporations, 49th Session, Res. 1998/8, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1999/4, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/45 (1998).
81 See UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Report of the
sessional working group on the working methods and activities of transnational corporations on its first
session, 50th Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/9 (1999).
8 Human Rights Principles and Responsibilities for Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Commentary on the Principles, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/WG.2.WP.1/Add.2,
at 5 (2002).
8 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, at Article 7.
84 Knight, Danielle, 'Cheers for Monsanto's Reversal on "Terminator"', Inter Press Service,
5 October 1999, available at www.oneworld.org (last visited 25 January 2003).
K In fact, at the time Monsanto promised not to market sterile seed technology, it did not yet
possess the rights to that specific technique. The technology was jointly developed by the
USDA and Delta and Pine Land Company, a smaller business that Monsanto was attempting
to take over. 'Terminator gene halt a "major U-Turn"', BBC News Online, 5 October 1999,
available at www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/465222.stm (last visited 31 January 2003).
86 Knight, loc.cit. (note 84).
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Although Monsanto's declaration was heralded as a 'significant victory for
developing countries', critics of terminator technology were quick to note
that the dangers of genetic manipulation of seeds had by no means
vanished. 7 At the time of its announcement not to market sterile seeds,
Monsanto was believed to have 87 other terminator patents pending in
developing countries, including one for a genetic modification that would
'make a seed not germinate unless exposed to a certain chemical'. 8 9 Other
major agribusinesses were pursuing similar patents for technology that
could be used to control various 'developmental processes in plants,
including germination, sprouting, flowering and fruit ripening'. The
potentially devastating effects that such technology could have on develo-
ping nations' agricultural sectors typified the concerns that motivated the
Sub-Commission to create the Working Group on the methods and
practices of transnational corporations, and was a significant factor in the
Sub-Commission's decision to adopt Resolution 2000/7.
3. THE GENESIS AND ADOPTION OF SUB-COMMISSION
RESOLUTION 2000/7
As the previous section of this article shows, human rights concerns had
been expressed with regard to intellectual property protection and global
trade, in the years before the Sub-Commission adopted Resolution 2000/7.
The Sub-Commission, however, had a more immediate catalyst for Resolu-
tion 2000/7 and its call for a human rights approach to devising
international intellectual property protection and global trade regimes.
In late July 2000, a Lutheran World Fund representative91 named Peter
Prove submitted to the Sub-Commission ajoint statement by three NGOs.92
This statement urged the Sub-Commission to 'take concrete action on
TRIPS (...) [by] reassert[ing] the primacy of human rights obligations over
the commercial and profit-driven motives upon which agreements such as
8 Idem.
88 Vidal, John, 'World braced for terminator 2', The Guardian Unlimited , 6 October 1999,
available at www.guardian.co.uk (last visited 31 January 2003).
8 Knight, loc.cit. (note 84).
9n Idem.
91 The Lutheran World Federation (LWF) is an international organisation of Lutheran
churches that provides humanitarian assistance in troubled areas of the world, and advocates
for greater awareness of human rights. Peter Prove is an LWF representative and is a well-
respected NGO advocate at the Sub-Commission.
9 The statement was submitted to the Sub-Commission by Habitat International Coalition, the
International NGO Committee on Human Rights in Trade and Investment [hereinafter
INCHRTI], and the Lutheran World Federation. UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 52nd
Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/NGO/14 (2000).
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TRIPS are based'. The statement specifically called attention to human
rights implications of economic globalisation, TRIPS' acceptance of
biopiracy, and TRIPS' stringent protection of TNC interests with respect
to technology transfers.94
Issues of globalisation, indigenous rights protection, and TNC behaviour
had been separately mentioned for years before Prove submitted the joint
statement. Nonetheless, the Sub-Commission had not taken any action in
regard to TRIPS and international intellectual property protection. Prove
found an ally in Asbjorn Eide, a Norwegian member of the Sub-Commission.
Eide proposed a resolution criticising existing international intellectual
property regimes. Because no one anticipated the proposal, there was little
opposition to Eide's resolution expressing human rights concerns about
TRIPS. That lack of opposition, combined with the Sub-Commission's
awareness of the related problems presented by globalisation and
indigenous rights, allowed Eide to push international intellectual property
protection onto the Sub-Commission's agenda.
Although the Sub-Commission softened its tone somewhat in compari-
son to the forceful language of the NGO statement, the actions urged by
Resolution 2000/7 were nonetheless a significant set of propositions.
Referencing Daes' work on indi enous cultural rights, problems highligh-
ted in the globalization report,1 and 'actual or potential conflicts (...)
between the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the realization of
economic, social and cultural rights',9 6 the resolution made the following
requests: (1) that governments give primary consideration to human rights
objectives when crafting national policy and legislation pertaining to
intellectual property; (2) that intergovernmental organisations provide
similar integration of human rights principles in their policies and practices;
(3) that the WTO in particular take human rights obligations into account
when reviewing the TRIPS Agreement; and (4) that various UN bodies
(including the High Commissioner for Human Rights (HCHR), the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Secretary-
General) take further measures to analyse the human rights impacts of the
TRIPS Agreement.9 7
4. REACTIONS TO RESOLUTION 200017
If the relationships between international intellectual property protection,
globalisation, and human rights had not been particularly visible before the
9 lbiden, at para. 6.
9 Idem.
9 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
96 Resolution 2000/7, see supra note 1, at preface. See also supra paragraph 2.1(2).
97 Resolution 2000/7, supra note 1, at paras 3-15.
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summer of 2000, they certainly were subjected to more detailed scrutiny
after the Sub-Commission adopted Resolution 2000/7. The Sub-Commis-
sion's resolution generated responses from UN bodies, intergovernmental
organisations, and governments.
4.1. The High Commissioner's Report on TRIPS and Human Rights
Pursuant to the Sub-Commission's request, the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (HCHR) submitted a report on the impact of TRIPS on
human rights. The HCHR's report undertook a two-step analysis. First, the
report assessed the degree to which TRIPS was compatible with a human
rights approach to intellectual property protection. Second, to the extent
that TRIPS did not comport with human rights standards, 9 8 the report made
recommendations for revisions of TRIPS' implementation that would foster
a more human rights-oriented approach to international intellectual
property protection.
The HCHR determined that as currently implemented, TRIPS was not
fully compatible with human rights objectives. First, the HCHR noted that
'the overall thrust of TRIPS is the promotion of innovation through the
provision of commercial incentives. The various links with the subject matter
of human rights (...) are generally expressed in terms of exceptions to the
rule rather than the guiding principles themselves'.9 9 Second, TRIPS
explicitly details intellectual property rights, but refers only to general
responsibilities of intellectual property holders. The HCHR indicated that, for
States parties to both TRIPS and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the balance of interests identified in TRIPS
Article 7100 might not be sufficient to meet its human rights obligations
under the Covenant.' 01 Third, the HCHR noted that the TRIPS-imposed
obligation 'to provide protection for all forms of technology limits States'
ability to decide on development strategies'. These limitations are designed
to encourage policies in industrialised countries. Those policies do not
necessarily coincide with objectives of developing nations. In addition, some
98 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, The Impact of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights: Report of the High
Commissioner [hereinafter the High Commissioner's TRIPS Report], 52nd Session, provisional
agenda item 4, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (2001), at para. 15.
9 Ibidem, at para. 22.
100 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
101 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 15 delineates a need
to balance protection of the interests of intellectual property holders and the public. In this
respect, the Covenant is similar to TRIPS Article 7. However, the HCHR noted that Covenant
Article 15 must be read in conjunction with Covenant Article 5, which holds that nothing in
the Covenant can justify any act aimed at the destruction of any of its rights or freedoms or to
limit a right beyond what is provided for in the Covenant. Hence, the Covenant may well
require greater obligations to realise human rights than does TRIPS Article 7. The High
Commissioner's TRIPS Report, see supra note 98, at para. 13.
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developing nations lack the requisite infrastructure to implement the
developed nation policies mandated by TRIPS.10 2 Further, the HCHR noted
that TRIPS contained no provisions for the protection of cultural heritage
and indigenous rights. 0 3
In light of these shortcomings the High Commissioner made a series of
recommendations. First, States should monitor TRIPS implementation
through national legislation to ensure that it meets the human rights
standards detailed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. Second, the HCHR encouraged States to modify their
intellectual property regimes to provide protection for indigenous commu-
nity interests. Third, States should pass legislation that ensured access to
essential drugs, so as to protect the right to the highest available standard of
health.104 Fourth, the High Commissioner suggested that TRIPS Article 7 be
amended to include an explicit reference to human rights. Further, the High
Commissioner encouraged the Sub-Commission to continue examining the
interaction of intellectual property rights and other human rights.105
4.2. The WTO/WIPO Response
The WTO and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) were
surprised by and did not agree with Resolution 2000/7's criticisms. Both
organisations stated that the tension between rights of intellectual property
holders and the public interest was 'complementary rather than mutually
exclusive', 0 6 and that TRIPS Article 7 adequately reflected this comple-
mentary tension. With respect to drug access, the organisations contended
that Article 8's recognition of States' interest in 'protecting health',' 07
coupled with Article 31's provisions for limited exceptions to the exclusivity
102 Ibidem, at paras 24-25.
1o3 Ibidem, at para. 26.
104 A large portion of the High Commissioner's Report was devoted to an analysis of whether
TRIPS left sufficient room for States to address public health issues; Brazil's approach to its
national AIDS crisis was one focus of this discussion. For a more detailed discussion of the
Brazil case, see infra notes 116-123 and accompanying text. The High Commissioner's report
determined that TRIPS does allow for States to enact legislation allowing compulsory
licensing and parallel importation of drugs in times of public health emergency. As a result,
the High Commissioner recommended that States pass national legislation securing those
privileges. The High Commissioner's TRIPS report, supra note 98, at para. 66.
1s The High Commissioner's recommendations can be found in the High Commissioner's
TRIPS Report, supra note 98, at paras 59-70.
1o6 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, IntellectualProperty and
Human Rights: Report of the Secretary-General, 52nd Session, Provisional Agenda Item 4, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/12 (2001), at Section B, para. 2 The Secretary-General's report consisted
of reactions to Resolution 2000/7 from various nations, NGOs, and intergovernmental bodies
that were delivered to the Secretary-General. Section B of this document contained the WTO's
response. See also UN Doc. E/CN.4/Stib.2/2001/12/Add.l (2001) (an addendum to the
Secretary-General's report with additional replies, including one from WIPO).
107 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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of patent protection,' 08 sufficiently enabled States to address their public
health concerns. 09 The WTO acknowledged that many national intellectual
property regimes did not provide comprehensive protection for traditional
knowledge. Nonetheless, the WTO thought that TRIPS mandated complete
protection of traditional knowledge, and that gaps in coverage might be
better filled by national legislation rather than by a retooling of TRIPS
itself. 110 In short, the WTO and WIPO did not concur with the Sub-
Commission's conclusion that TRIPS conflicted with human rights objec-
tions.
4.3. State Responses
Echoing the WTO/WIPO positions, the European Commission also
asserted that TRIPS adequately provided for the realisation of human
rights. Like the WTO and WIPO, the Commission thought that TRIPS
Article 7 struck an appropriate balance of interests."' The Commission
reiterated that TRIPS principles should not allow patenting of traditional
knowledge. The Commission noted that TRIPS does not speak directly to
the issue, but believed that this silence provided States with enough leeway
to enact legislation specific to traditional knowledge if they so desired."
The Commission also encouraged the creation of traditional knowledge
databases, as well as reference to the geographic origin of biological material
seeking patent protection, in order to reduce conflicts in instances like the
Neem Tree Case.F
The European Commission did not believe that TRIPS needed to be
altered in order to enable States to address public health concerns. The
Commission thought that developing nations and the international
community should concentrate on preventing disease, fostering drug
distribution mechanisms, and building health care infrastructures, rather
than pressuring large pharmaceutical companies to provide cheap
medicines.11 4 The Commission also voiced concerns about over-reliance
1os See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
'o UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/12 (2001), op.cit. (note 106), at para. 10, and the Addendum
at paras 8-12.
110 Ibidem, at paras 11-13.
European Commission, European Community Response to Resolution 2000/7, at para. 7
(undated document, 2000).
112 Ibidem, at paras 22-23.
113 Idem.
1 Ibidem, at para. 12. The Commission also indicated a concern that providing cheap drugs
could lead to problems with parallel importation. When a pharmaceutical company engages
in differential pricing based on the purchasing power of a given market, it runs the risk of
selling drugs cheaply to a poor nation that may turn around and re-sell the product to a
nation with greater purchasing power. This problem would leave the poor nation with no
drugs and reduce the pharmaceutical company's profits.
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on the compulsory licensing exception provided in TRIPS Article 31,
arguing that rigorous patent protection is necessary in order to provide
pharmaceutical companies with an incentive to continue research and
development programmes. 11 5
Unlike the European Commission, some States believed that affordable
medicine constituted a crucial step in promoting public health. The most
visible test of TRIPS' mandates came from Brazil, whose 1997 decision to
enact compulsory licensing legislation enabled generic production of
internationally patented AIDS drugs." 6 Although contentious at the time,
Brazil's acts have generally been considered a stunning public health
success. Within four years of initiating its compulsory licensing programme,
Brazil reduced its AIDS death rate by 50 per cent, while simultaneously
reducing per capita expenditures on pharmaceuticals.1 1 7 Indeed, the High
Commissioner's TRIPS report, discussed above, praised the Brazilian
Government for 'implementing the public health safeguards in the TRIPS
Agreement' in a way that 'has successfully married implementation of the
Agreement with its obligations under human rights law'." 8
The United States contested Brazil's compulsory licensing programme.
In January 2001, the United States requested the establishment of a WTO
dispute resolution panel, alleging that Brazil's compulsory licensing law
violated US patent holders' rights guaranteed by TRIPS.119 The US
subsequently agreed to drop the WTO suit, provided that Brazil consult
with the US Government if Brazil intended to implement compulsory
licensing in the future. 120
The US decision to drop its complaint was influenced by the UN
Commission on Human Rights adoption of a resolution supporting Brazil's
compulsory licensing programme. Commission Resolution 2001/33 called
upon States to 'pursue policies (...) which promote (...) [t]he availability in
sufficient quantities of pharmaceuticals (...) used to treat pandemics such as
"' Ibidem, at para. 14.
11 The Brazilian Intellectual Property Law enacted in 1997 (Law No. 9279 of 14 May 1996;
effective May 1997) authorised the government to provide for compulsory licensing where a
patent holder exercises patent rights in an abusive manner, and in cases of national
emergency or public interest. These provisions mimic the TRIPS' compulsory licensing
provision outlined in Article 31. The High Commissioner's Report, see supra note 98, at para.
55.
117 Brazil also saw an 80 per cent decrease in hospitalisation due to opportunistic diseases that so
often afflict AIDS patients. The Brazilian Ministry of Health reduced its drug expenditure
from USD 336 million to USD 319 million between 1999 and 2000, yet also managed to
deliver drugs to an additional 12,000 patients during that same 12-month span. Local
production of generic drugs has cut production costs by an average of 70 per cent since the
inception of the compulsory licensing program. Ibidem, at para. 70.
" Ibidem, at para. 58.
"' Brazil-Measures Affecting Patent Protection: Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States,
WT/DS199/3 (9 January 2001).
120 Brazil-Measures Affecting Patent Protection: Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, WT/DS199/4
(19 July 2001).
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HIV/AIDS'.12' To that end, the Commission encouraged States to 'adopt
legislation (...) to safeguard access to preventative, curative or palliative
pharmaceuticals or medical technologies from any limitations by third
parties'.122 Furthermore, the Commission called on States to 'refrain from
taking measures which would deny or limit equal access for all persons to
[such pharmaceuticals and medical technologies] .123 This resolution
endorsed Brazil's compulsory licensing programme, and discouraged
aggressive pharmaceutical patent protection such as the US complaint
pending with the WTO at the time. The US abstention constituted the only
opposition to the otherwise unanimous adoption of Commission Resolution
2001/33.
A scenario similar to the US-Brazil dispute took place when the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa sued the South
African Government in South Africa's Constitutional Court.124  The
pharmaceutical manufacturers' alleged that an amendment to South
Africa's patent laws infringed on the manufacturers' property rights and
conflicted with TRIPS-mandated patent protection.12 5 The pharmaceutical
manufacturers settled their suit in April 2001, in light of the South African
Government's agreement to consult a pharmaceutical working group before
121 UN Commission on Human Rights, Access to medication in the context of pandemics such as HIV/
AIDS, 57th Session, 71st Mtg., UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/33 (2001), at para. 2(a).
122 Ibidem, at para. 3(b).
123 Ibidem, at para. 3(a).
124 Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Asssciation of South Africa vs President of the Republic of South Africa, Case No.
4183/98 (High Court of South Africa 1998).
125 The Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, No. 90 of 1997, gave the
South African Health Minister sole power to define 'prescribed conditions' for the supply of
'more affordable medicines' in 'certain circumstances'. See Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Association of
South Africa, supra note 124, at para. 2.1. One practical effect of the Amendment Act was to
give the Health Minister the power to enact parallel importation of patented drugs. See
Joseph, Sarah, 'Pharmaceutical Corporations and Access to Drugs: The Fourth Wave of
Corporate Human Rights Scrutiny', Human Rights Quarterly. The amendment also gave the
Health Minister the sole power to prescribe conditions under which compulsory licenses
could be granted. The South African Government already had the ability to grant compulsory
licenses pursuant to the Patents Act of 1978. The Amendment Act, however, increased the
discretion of the Government to determine the conditions under which compulsory licenses
would be granted. See Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Association of South Africa vs President of the Republic of
South Africa, supra note 124, at para. 2.2. The pharmaceutical manufacturers alleged that the
Amendment Act authorised the Government to deprive pharmaceutical patent holders of
their intellectual property, or to appropriate that property without providing compensation.
See ibidem, at para. 2.3. Such a taking was alleged to violate Section 25 of the South African
Constitution, which states that 'property may be expropriated only (...) for a public purpose
or in the public interest, and subject to compensation...', Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa, Act 108 of 1996, Section 25, available at www.polity.org.za/govdocs/constitution/
saconst.html. Further, the pharmaceutical manufacturers alleged that the parallel importa-
tion authorisation violated TRIPS' Article 27 prohibition on discrimination with respect to
importation or local production of patented products. See Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Association of
South Africa, supra note 124, at para. 2.4.
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implementing its new laws. 126 The pharmaceutical group's decision to drop
their complaint was prompted in part by strong global protest to the suit.
The Commission on Human Rights' impending adoption of Resolution
2001/33 (which endorsed Brazil's compulsory licensing programme) and
Sub-Commission Resolution 2000/7 may also have contributed to the
decision to drop the South African suit.
4.4. Response of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights
Three months after the adoption of Sub-Commission Resolution 2000/7,
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights held a day of
discussion in November 2000 to consider whether TRIPS potentially
conflicts with human rights norms in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.' 2 8 The day of discussion was intended
to lay a foundation for the eventual adoption of a general comment on the
relationship between intellectual property rights and human rights
standards. 12
The discussion relied heavily on a discussion paper prepared by Audrey
Chapman, a representative of the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science. 130 Peter Prove, the LWF lobbyist who had provided the
initial impetus for the Sub-Commission to consider adopting Resolution
2000/7, also contributed to the discussion.' 3 ' Background papers and
26 The Minister of Health agreed to invite a working party from the pharmaceutical industry to
consult with the Government in formation of policies, legislation, and regulations that would
be enacted to implement the Amendment Act. The Government, however, made explicit
mention of TRIPS' allowance for the adoption of measures necessary to protect public health
and broaden access to medicines. joint Statement of Understanding Between the Republic of South
Africa and the Applicants, in the matter between: The Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Association of South Africa
vs The President of the Republic of South Affica, 19 April 2001, available at www.efpia.org/3_press/
20010419.htm.
127 The South African pharmaceutical manufacturers settled their suit on 19 April 2001. The
Commission on Human Rights adopted Resolution 2001/33 on 23 April 2001. It seems
plausible to think that the pharmaceutical manufacturers were tracking the buildup to
Resolution 2001/33's adoption, and understood that a UN endorsement of compulsory
licensing would reflect badly on the pharmaceutical manufacturers' suit.
12 UN Commission on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Report on the twenty-second, twenty-
third and twenty-fourth sessions, ECOSOC, Supp. 2, UN Docs E/2001/22 and E/C.12/2000/21
(2000), at para. 578.
'2 Ibidem, at para. 579.
1o Approaching intellectual property as a human right: obligations related to article 15, paragraph 1(c),
submitted to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by Audrey Chapman,
American Association for the Advancement of Science, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/12 (2000).
131 UN Does E/2001/22 and E/C.12/2000/21 (2000), op.cit. (note 128), at para. 629. Also
present was Miloon Kothari, representing the International NGO Committee on Human
Rights in International Trade and Investment. That NGO was one of groups that jointly
presented the statement to the Sub-Commission that eventually resulted in the adoption of
Resolution 2000/7. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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commentary on cultural property and traditional knowledge rights also
played a prominent part in the discussion.' 3 2
Chapman's presentation to the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights stated that the creation of the WTO and TRIPS had
strengthened the world intellectual property regime in a way that was
inconsistent with human rights norms. She further stated that the
international intellectual property regime had 'demonstrated detrimental
effects to the rights enshrined in the [Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights] . She specifically noted that the current intellectual
property regime did not apply to indigenous creations and knowledge,
negatively affected the right to health by reducing the availability of
pharmaceuticals, and threatened the right to food by extending broad plant
patent protection to a few agricultural companies that hold patents on the
genomes of important global crops.' 34  The Economic and Social
Committee's Chairperson concluded the discussion by reiterating the
Committee's intent to draft a general comment on intellectual property and
human rights.1 s5
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has not
adopted a General Comment yet. Instead, the Committee drafted a less
visible and less ambitious statement that outlines their concerns about the
effect of intellectual property regimes on key human rights principles
derived from the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.136 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stated
that intellectual property has 'a social function (...) [of] serv[ing] the
objective of human well-being, to which international human rights
instruments give legal expression'.' 3 7 In addition, '[h]uman rights are
fundamental, inalienable and universal entitlements (...) whereas intellec-
tual property rights (...) are instrumental (...) generally of a temporary
nature, and can be revoked, licensed or assigned to someone else'.' 8 The
Committee also asserted that '[w]hile the State holds the primary duty to
respect, protect and fulfil human rights, other actors, including non-State
132 Background papers were submitted by a Swiss scholar and by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Commission. See Meyer-Bisch, Patrice, Protection of Cultural Property: an individual and
collective right, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/16 (2000). See also Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Commission, Protecting the rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional
knowledge, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/17 (2000).
13 UN Docs E/2001/22 and E/C.12/2000/21 (2000), op.cit. (note 128), at para. 587.
13 Idem.
'3 Ibidem, at para. 635.
136 UN Commission on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Human Rights and Intellectual
Property: Statement of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 27th Session, Agenda
item 3, UN Doc. E/C.12/2001/15 (2001), at para. 2.
'3 Ibidem, at para. 4.
138 Ibidem, at para. 6 (citing Report of the High Commissioner on the impact of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on human rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13
(2001), at para. 14).
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actors and international organizations, carry obligations, which must be
subject to scrutiny'.
The Committee elaborated on the most important obligations imposed
by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
While acknowledging that the Covenant allows for 'progressive realization'
of some of the Covenant's objectives, the Committee reminded States
Parties of 'various obligations which have immediate effect, including core
obligations.'14 0 Core obligations require States Parties to 'ensure the
satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the
rights' enunciated in the Covenant.1 4 1 In particular, the Committee
'emphasize [d] that any intellectual property regime that makes it more
difficult to comply with its core obligations in relation to health, food, [or]
education (...) is inconsistent with the legally binding obligations of the
State party.' 4 2
In addition to States' core obligations in relation to health, food, and
education, the Committee noted that the International Covenant 'sets out a
need to balance the protection of public and private interests in
knowledge'.143 On the one hand, Articles 15(1) (a) and (b) of the Covenant
recognise 'the right of everyone to take part in cultural life and to enjoy the
benefits of scientific progress and its applications'. On the other hand,
Article 15(1) (c) recognises 'the right of everyone to benefit from the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific,
literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author'. 144 The
Committee urged States to 'strike a balance between those concurrent
Covenant provisions' in developing intellectual property regimes.145 The
Committee referenced with approval the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
13 UN Doc. E/C.12/2001/15 (2001), op.cit. (note 136), at para. 10.
140 Ibidem, at para. 11.
141 Ibidem, at para. 12 (citing General Comment No. 3 - the nature of States parties' obligations,
Commission on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 5th Session (1990), at para. 10,
available in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human
Rights Treaty Bodies: note by the Secretariat, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1Rev.5 (2001)).
142 UN Doc. E/C.12/2001/15 (2001), op.cit. (note 136), at para. 12. Article 11 of the
International Covenant recognises a right to food. See also discussion at para. 4.5 (1), infra.
See also generally General Comment No. 12 - the right to adequate food, Commission on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, 29th Session (1999) available in UN Doc. HRI/GEN/lRev.5
(2001), op.cit. (note 141). Article 12 of the International Covenant recognises the right to the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. See generally General Comment No.
14 - the right to the highest attainable standard of health, Commission on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 22nd Session (2000) available in UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1Rev.5 (2001), op.cit.
(note 141). Article 13 of the International Covenant recognises the right to education, which
shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. See generally
General Comment No. 13 - the right to education, Commission on Econmic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 21st Session (1999), available in UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1Rev.5 (2001), op.cit. (note 141).
1s UN Doc. E/C.12/2001/15 (2001), op.cit. (note 136), at para. 17.
1 Idem.
14 Idem.
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Agreement and Public Health, which 'recognizes that intellectual property
protection is important for the development of new medicines, but at the
same time also recognizes the concerns about its effect on prices'. 146
In summary, the Committee's statement reminded States Parties of the
'importance of integrating international human rights norms into the
enactment and interpretation of intellectual property law' in a balanced
manner that protects public and private interests in knowledge without
infringing on fundamental human rights.147 When close questions arise
about where the appropriate balance lies, States should draw the balance so
as to maintain the integrity of human rights.
4.5. Continuing Efforts of the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights
(1) Report on Globalisation
The High Commissioner's Report on the impact of TRIPS on human rights,
discussed at paragraph 4.1 above, was the first of a triad of reports, prompted
by the Sub-Commission's resolution and proposed by the Office of the High
Commissioner, concerning human rights and trade. The second report
examined the impact of globalisation on the enjoyment of human rights by
outlining issues that arise when liberalisation of agricultural trade is viewed
from a human rights perspective.148 Specifically, the report examined the
implementation of the 1994 WTO Agreement on Agriculture to highlight
some of the problems stemming from the liberalisation of agricultural trade.
The High Commissioner's report reminded WTO States of their obligations
under international human rights instruments. In particular, the report
noted that all WTO States are subject to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and that 112 of the 144 WTO States have ratified the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.149 Both instruments
recognise the right of everyone to have an adequate standard of living,
which includes the right to food. 1o Article 2 of International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights binds parties to 'take steps,
individually and through international assistance and cooperation (...) with
a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized
in the present Covenant...1'5 Article 28 of the Universal Declaration states
146 Idem. For further discussion of the Doha Declaration, see infra paragraph 5.
14 UN Doc. E/C.12/2001/15 (2001), ap.cit. (note 136), at para. 18.
14 UN Commission on Human Rights, Globalization and Its Impact on the Full Enjoyment of Human
Rights: Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ESCOR, 58th Session, provisional
agenda item 10, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/54 (2002), at para. 8.
149 Ibidem, at para. 10.
150 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 A(III), UN Doc. A/810 (1948), at
Article 25; see also International Covenant on Economic., Social and Cultural Rights, supra
note 4, at Article 11.
1 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 4, at Article 2.
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that '[e]veryone is entitled to a social and international order in which the
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized'.i 5 2 By
reminding WTO States of their obligations under these instruments, the
High Commissioner's report indicated that WTO States have a binding
obligation to protect and promote the right to food, even as they seek to
liberalise trade in agriculture.15 3
The High Commissioner's report concluded that the WTO Agreement
on Agriculture (AoA) generates both positive and negative human rights
results. On the positive side, the AoA increases transparency and
accountability in international agricultural trade, which the High Commis-
sioner characterised as an 'im ortant first step (...) towards a more fair
international trading system'.1
The High Commissioner's report also highlighted some of the potential
human rights issues that might arise as a result of global trade liberalisation
in agriculture. First, liberalisation has encouraged farm consolidation.
Although this trend has increased productivity and competition, it has also
marginalised small farmers and farm labourers, and exposed communities
to increases in food prices.155 Second, trade liberalisation has forced some
developing countries into a chronic system of net food importation. The
resultant payment imbalances could eventually hinder developing nations'
ability to realise their right to development. 5 Third, agricultural price
fluctuations created by trade liberalisation could negatively impact some
nations' ability to finance development, or even affect a State's ability to
guarantee availability of food.' 5 7
(2) Report on Liberalisation of Trade in Services
In the summer of 2002, the Office of the High Commissioner submitted the
final report in its tripartite examination of the interaction of trade and
human rights. The report focused on the human rights effect of liberalisa-
tion of trade in services. In the same way that its report on globalisation used
a specific agreement (the AoA) as a case study, the High Commissioner's
report on trade in services examined the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS).
152 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 150, at Article 28.
153 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/54 (2002), op.cit. (note 148), at para. 10.
1 Ibidem, at para. 27.
155 Ibidem, at para. 35. For example, the High Commissioner's report references a UN Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) study that showed an adverse effect of agricultural trade
liberalisation on 300,000 potato and onion farmers in Sri Lanka. The same study indicated
that consolidation of Brazilian dairy farms were squeezing out traditional cooperatives. Idem
(citing FAO, Agriculture, Trade and Food Security Issues and Options in the WTO Negotiations from
the Perspective of Developing Countries, Vol. II, Country Case Studies, FAO Commodities and
Trade Division, Rome, 2000, at p. 25).
156 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/54 (2002), op.cit. (note 148), at para. 37.
15 Ibidem, at para. 38.
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The report again reminded WTO States of their obligations under the
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Universal
Declaration to promote the right to food. The report also noted the right to
development. Since liberalisation of trade in services encompasses a
wider range of activities than agricultural trade services, the report extended
the scope of State obligations to include the rights to health, education,
water, and labour.15 9 The High Commissioner characterised States as the
'duty bearer[s] for human rights',' 60 and therefore asserted that States have
an affirmative obligation to (1) monitor the realisation of human rights; (2)
develop domestic trade policies that promote human rights objectives; and
(3) regulate extra-national third party activities that affect human rights in
the State."'
The High Commissioner's report stressed that liberalisation of trade in
services frequently has a positive effect on human rights. Therefore, 'the key
question from a human rights perspective is not whether liberalization does
or does not promote human rights; rather, it is how to determine the right
form and pace of liberalization to ensure the protection of human rights
and how to reverse policies that are unsuccessful'. 6 2 The report indicated
that effective State regulation and oversight, buttressed by international
assistance to developing countries, is integral to controlling the pace and
form of liberalization.' 6
The High Commissioner noted with approval GATS' recognition of the
principle of non-discrimination. In the context of trade law, non-
discrimination means equal treatment for national and foreign service
providers alike. The non-discrimination principle can be extended,
however, to encompass the human rights view of non-discrimination in
terms of race, colour, sex, etc. 164 The High Commissioner also endorsed
B8 See supra notes 149-153 and accompanying text.
159 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Liberalization of
Trade in Services and Human Rights: Report of the High Commissioner, 54th Session, provisional
agenda item 4, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9 (2002), at para. 7.
160 Ibidem, at para. 10.
"' To this end, the High Commissioner encouraged State ministries and agencies to conduct
human rights assessments that would promote popular participation and consultation with
the people affected by trade liberalisation. The High Commissioner also advocated for
increased transparency and accountability with respect to the methods of assessment and
trade negotiations. Ibidem, at paras 10-13.
162 Ibidem, at para. 50.
163 Idem. The High Commissioner specifically stressed the need for regulation that would
implement effective competition policies and corporate transparency, as well as national
policies reflecting a commitment to providing universal service. The High Commissioner
stated that '[i]n human rights terms, the need to regulate (...) is in fact a duty to regulate; (...)
to 'fulfil' human rights requires States to take appropriate legislative, administrative,
budgetary, judicial and other measures towards the full realization of such rights' (emphasis
added).
164 Ibidem, at para. 59.
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GATS' exceptions for the purposes of protecting public morals, as well as
human, animal and plant life, and the protection of individual privacy.165
5. PROGRESS
Sub-Commission Resolution 2000/7 encouraged a series of investigations
into the human rights implications of international intellectual property
protection and trade liberalisation. The heightened global awareness about
the human rights implications of intellectual property and global trade has
produced some positive results. Most significantly, the W'TO Ministerial
Conference at Doha in November 2001 responded to several of those
human rights concerns.
The Ministerial Conference adopted a special declaration that explicitly
addressed the issue of the interaction of TRIPS and public health concerns.
The declaration stated that 'the [TRIPS] Agreement can and should be
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members'
right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all'.166 To that end, the declaration reminded WTO States
that TRIPS recognises the right to grant compulsory licenses, as well as the
ability to implement parallel importation mechanisms. Furthermore, the
declaration noted that 'public health crises, including those relating to
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency', which
enable States to initiate compulsory licensing under TRIPS Article 31.
The Ministerial Conference's declaration instructed the Council for
TRIPS (a TRIPS review body) to take into account the issues pertaining to
traditional knowledge and folklore when reviewing TRIPS' exclusivity
requirements.' 6 9 Furthermore, the declaration stated that 'special and
differential treatment for developing countries shall be an integral part of
(...) enabl[ing] developing countries to effectively take account of their
development needs, including food security and rural development'. 70 In
addition, the declaration recognised the 'particular vulnerability of the least-
developed countries and the special structural difficulties they face in the
global economy', and committed the WTO to 'addressing the marginaliza-
165 Ibidem, at para. 63. The High Commissioner noted that these protections are 'familiar themes
to human rights law', and stated that although 'a human rights approach would place the
promotion of human rights at the centre of the objectives of GATS rather than as permitted
exceptions, these links nonetheless provide an entry point for a human rights approach to
liberalization...' Idem.
' Declaration on the TRIPSAgreenent and public health, Doha WTO Ministerial 2001, UN Doc. WT/
MIN(01)/DEC/2 (2001), at para. 4.
167 Ibidem, at para. 5(b) and (d).
168 &idem, at para. 5(c).
169 bidem, at para. 19.
170 bidem, at para. 13.
212
The Sub-Commission's Initiative on Human Rights and Intellectual Property
tion of least-developed countries in international trade and to improving
their effective participation in the multilateral trading system'. 1 71 Further,
the declaration noted that 'under WTO rules no country should be
prevented from taking measures for the protection of human, animal or
plant life or health (...) subject to the requirement that they (...) are
otherwise in accordance with the provisions of the WTO Agreements'.
The declaration also reaffirmed the right of WTO members to regulate the
supply of services under GATS,17 3 and confirmed the WTO's responsibility
to make its operations transparent and democratic. 74
The United States' initial responses to the Doha Declaration's objectives
have been mixed. With respect to trade liberalisation, the US submitted to
the WTO a proposal suggesting the removal of international regulatory
procedures for legal, financial, and insurance services, and also recommen-
ded lowering trade restrictions in the telecommunications, energy, and
environmental services.175 In addition, the Bush administration promised to
contribute USD 1 million to the 'Doha Development Agenda Trust Fund,
[which] aim [s] at building the capacity for developing countries to
participate in the full range of WTO negotiations and activities agreed to
in Doha'.'"6 In the agricultural realm, the United States is leading a drive to
eliminate export subsidies within five years.17 7
The United States position on measures designed to provide affordable
medication to treat AIDS and other epidemics has been more ambiguous.
The Doha Declaration set a December 2002 deadline by which the Council
for TRIPS was to have reached agreement on a policy under which least-
developed WTO Members could import generically manufactured copies of
patented pharmaceuticals.1 78 The Council for TRIPS failed to meet that
deadline amid reports of US objections to the number of diseases and
eligible importing nations that some WTO Members wanted to include in
the scheme for relaxing pharmaceutical patent protection. 7 9 In the wake of
171 Ibidem, at para. 3.
172 Ibidem, at para. 6.
17 Ibiden, at para. 7.
174 Ibidem, at para. 10.
175 Office of the United States Trade Representative press release 2002-63, United States Proposals
for Liberalizing Trade in Services, 1 July 2002, available at www.ustr.gov/releases/2002/07/02-
63.pdf (last visited 23 January 2002).
176 Idea,
177~ Idem,
1 Copson, Raymond W., AIDS in Africa: Issue Brief for Congress, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and
Trade Division, Congressional Research Service, Order Code 1B10050, updated 7 January
2003, at CRS-1, available at www.usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/hiv/ibl0050aidsaf.pdf (last
visited 25 January 2003).
1 Idem. The US State Department reported that some (unspecified) WTO Members sought to
allow wealthier WITO Members onto the list of 'poor country epidemic' nations that were
meant to be the focus of the Doha Declaration's emphasis on relaxations of patent protection
allowable pursuant to TRIPS Article 31. In addition, the State Department reported that some
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that failure, the United States proposed an exception to TRIPS Article 31
that would allow least-developed nations with health epidemics to import
generically manufactured drugs from developing nations that currently
provide patent protection for the pharmaceuticals in question.o8 0 While the
US proposal indicated a willingness to ease patent protection in some cases,
it did not give explicit guidance as to which specific drugs could be
manufactured.s18
On 30 August 2003, on the eve of the WTO Ministerial Meeting in
Cancun, Mexico, the WTO General Council for TRIPS appeared to resolve
the dispute about implementing the Doha Declaration by adopting a
decision which essentially permitted a patent exception rule to allow
countries to produce medicine for export in order to fulfill public health
needs in countries that do not have production capacities.' 8 2 The decision
WTO Members sought to expand the classes of drugs available for generic manufacture and
import to include drugs not designed for the treatment of epidemic diseases (e.g., Viagra). US
Department of State International Information Programs, U.S. Announces Interim HIV/AIDS
Plan for Poor Countries, 23 December 2002, available at www.usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/
hiv/02122301.htm (last visited 25 January 2003).
1o TRIPS currently allows WTO Members to use a compulsory license to import a generically
manufactured drug from another country provided that the exporting country has not
granted a patent on that drug. The problem is that TRIPS Article 31 (f) currently prohibits a
WTO Member that has granted patent protection from generically producing a drug for
export, even if the importing country has a health epidemic and lacks the domestic
infrastructure to manufacture generic drugs. The US proposal envisions either a dispute
resolution moratorium or a waiver of TRIPS Article 31 (f) so that developing nations with the
capacity to produce generic drugs could export those drugs to a least developed nation, even
when the exporting nation has granted patent protection. The US proposal also takes pains to
note that exporting nations would be expected to 'ensure that the medicines (...) are not
diverted from the Member for which they were intended, either by being diverted to other
markets or by leaking onto the domestic market of the exporting Member'. Furthermore, the
US proposal indicates that an importing Member might still owe some discounted measure of
compensation to the patent holder (although the licensing fees paid to the patent holder by
the exporting nation would be used to offset the total amount of compensation owed by the
importing Member). US Department of State, International Information Programs, A Second
Communication from the United States of America Relating to Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, available at www.usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/wto/
tripshealth02O625.htm (last visited 25 January 2003).
'81 The US proposal suggests that any WTO Member with least-developed nation status be
presumed to have insufficient infrastructure to produce its own generic pharmaceuticals, and
thus would be allowed to import generic drugs under the proposed exception to TRIPS
Article 31(f). Developing Members not designated as 'high income countries' would also be
eligible to import generic drugs (thus Barbados, Brunei, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Israel, Kuwait,
Liechtenstein, Macao, Malta, Qatar, Singapore, Slovenia, Taiwan and the United Arab
Emirates would not be allowed to import generic pharmaceuticals even in cases of health
epidemics). The US proposal does provide a list of potential diseases that could qualify a
Member for Article 31 exception (including ebola, trypanosomiasis, cholera, dengue, typhoid,
and typhus fevers); it does not specify which pharmaceuticals could be generically produced.
See US Department of State International Information Programs, op.cit. (note 179).
1 WTO Council for TRIPS, Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and public health, www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/tripse/implem-para6_e.htm (last
visited 1 September 2003).
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dealt with US concerns that the patent exception rule would lead to the
distribution of generic medicines for non-infectious diseases and with
concerns about the re-export of such medicines to other markets.
While it was hoped that the pre-Cancun agreement for implementing the
Doha Declaration would help facilitate a successful Ministerial Meeting in
Cancun, the meeting ended without tangible results on agricultural trade
and the other issues that had been on the agenda. Similarly, the post-
Cancun results for implementing the Doha Declaration have been
disappointingly slow in coming. No pharmaceuticals have actually been
produced under the Doha Declaration and the subsequent agreement. Very
few developing countries will actually have the technical capacity to take
advantage of the agreements. Even if they develop that technical capacity,
pharmaceutical producers in the developing world are concerned that while
governments are bound not to object to the production of the necessary
medicines, the pharmaceutical companies can still initiate private legal
actions on the basis of their patents. Also, once a producer or government in
a developed country has spent substantial funds to retro-engineer critical
medicines, the patent holders can then undermine all those efforts at the
last moment by offering to sell their own products at a very low price so as to
undercut the marketing of drugs produced in the developing country.' 3 As
with many struggles in the international domain, victories are hard won and
require continual vigilance.
6. CONCLUSION
Sub-Commission Resolution 2000/7 expressed concern for the human
rights implications of trends in world trade and globalisation. By adopting
the resolution, the Sub-Commission thus played a role in initiating a
broader effort to develop a human rights approach to intellectual property
protection, world trade, and globalisation. Although Sub-Commission
resolutions ordinarily have less impact than resolutions arising from the
Commission on Human Rights, the Economic and Social Council, the
General Assembly, or certainly the Security Council, Sub-Commission
Resolution 2000/7 apparently caused a rethinking of the relationship
between trade and human rights, in general, and intellectual property and
human rights, in particular. One way of understanding the impact of
Resolution 2000/7 is to repeat the adage: 'Nothing is more powerful than an
idea whose time has come'.184
183 For an update of the situation, see Attaran, Amir, 'Assessing and Answering Paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health: The case for Greater Flexibility
and a Non-Justiciability Solution', Emory International Law Review, Vol. 17, 2003, p. 743.
184 Hugo, Victor, Oeuvres Compless: Histoire, 1877, p. 456: 'On resiste a linvasion des arm6es, on
ne resiste pas A linvasion des idees.' [One can resist the invasion of armies, but not the
invasion of ideas.]
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